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Abstract
We examine the risk-return characteristics of a rolling portfolio investment strategy where more
than 6,300 Nasdaq IPO stocks are bought and held for up to five years over the 1973-2000 period.
The puzzling low average long-run (raw) return to IPO stocks first reported by Ritter (1991)
manifests itself in this much larger sample as well. As Brav and Gompers (1997) and Brav,
Geczy, and Gompers (2000), we challenge the claim that the returns are too low to be explained
within standard, rational asset pricing paradigms. However, our risk explanation goes beyond
the earlier papers’ reference to a general—but poorly understood—book-to-market effect in the
average return to small growth stocks. We show that the typical IPO firm exhibits relatively
low leverage and high liquidity. There is theoretical basis for arguing that each of these two
characteristics lower the systematic risk exposure of equity returns. Our factor model estimation,
which includes a new liquidity risk factor, produces estimates consistent with this explanation.
We cannot reject the hypothesis that the low average IPO returns are commensurable with their
risk exposures, as defined here.
∗We have benefitted from the comments of Brad Barber, Melanie Cao, Tarun Chordia, Chris Geczy, Wayne
Ferson, Raymond Kan, Craig Lewis, Yang Liu, Stephan Nagel, Jay Ritter, and seminar participants at Berkeley,
Dartmouth, Concordia University, MIT, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, Ohio State
University, Stanford University, University of British Columbia, University of Toronto, and Vanderbilt University, as
well as the participants at the ABN-AMRO International Conference on Initial Public Offerings (2000), the 2000-
meetings of the Northern Finance-, the European Finance-, and the European Financial Management associations,
the 2001-meetings of the American Finance- and the Western Finance associations. To contact the authors, email at
b.espen.eckbo@dartmouth.edu and norli@mgmt.utoronto.ca.
1 Introduction
Following the early work of Ritter (1991), it is now well known that IPO stocks generate low returns
over holding periods of two–to–five years following the IPO date. On the one hand, these holding-
period returns appear so low as to challenge the fundamental notion of rational and efficient capital
market pricing, providing a motivation for the development of behavioral asset pricing models
where the marginal investor is slow to assimilate publicly available information.1 On the other
hand, surprisingly little is known about the true long-run risk-return characteristics of IPO stocks.
Brav and Gompers (1997) and Brav, Geczy, and Gompers (2000) present systematic evidence that
the low post-IPO return pattern is concentrated in small growth stocks. Thus, the low post-
IPO returns may be a manifestation of the more general finding of Fama and French (1993) that
small growth stocks generally have low returns during the post-1963 period. While this finding is
important, it does not explain the economic fundamentals of the low IPO returns. In this paper, we
provide new, large-sample evidence on links between firm-specific characteristics such as leverage
and liquidity and risk-return tradeoffs for IPO stocks. In addition to advancing our understanding
of the return-generating process of IPO shares, this evidence also points to broader pricing issues
related to leverage and liquidity.
With a sample exceeding 6,300 Nasdaq IPOs over the 1972-1998 period, we show that IPO stocks
are both significantly less leveraged and exhibit significantly greater liquidity (stock turnover) than
non-IPO firms matched on stock exchange, equity size and book-to-market ratio.2 The discovery
of greater liquidity is important as it suggests a potential liquidity-based explanation for lower
expected returns to IPO stocks. Our finding of lower leverage is consistent with the fact that IPO
firms tend to have fewer assets in place and lower current earnings to support extensive borrowing
as compared to more seasoned companies. We explore these findings by estimating parameters
in empirical factor models where the risk factors have links to leverage and stock liquidity. The
basic hypothesis to be tested concern whether IPO stocks have lower expected return due to these
characteristics.
1See, e.g., Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998), Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998), and Hong and
Stein (1999)].
2As explained below, over the sample period, more than 90% of all IPOs took place on Nasdaq. Adding back
the 432 IPOs on NYSE/Amex over the sample period does not materially affect any of the paper’s conclusions. At
the same time, the Nasdaq restriction helps comparing ”apples with apples” which is useful when selecting non-IPO
matched firms.
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For the leverage analysis, we draw on the multifactor models of Merton (1973) and Ross (1976)
and include macroeconomic risk factors such as the changes in the term spread, the default spread,
and unexpected inflation.3 Following the argument in Galai and Masulis (1976), factor loadings
(betas) estimated using equity returns depend on the firm’s leverage ratio. The leverage effect
enters through the product of the firm-value beta and the elasticity of equity price with respect
to firm value. Since this elasticity increase with leverage, systematic risk is generally increasing in
leverage (and time varying as leverage changes over time). Our test strategy involves comparing
factor loadings of IPO stocks with those of non-IPO matched firms, to see if these differ in the
direction predicted by the ”turbo charging” effect of leverage.4
Turning to our analysis of liquidity, a growing body of empirical research suggests that greater
stock liquidity reduces risk.5 To examine this possibility in the context of our IPO stocks, we
expand the Fama and French (1993) model with a new liquidity risk factor generated in the same
way as the original Fama-French factors themselves. Sorting first on equity size, this new factor is
a portfolio long in low-liquidity stocks and short in high-liquidity stocks. Interestingly, we find that
our liquidity factor performs well when applied to the 25 Fama-French size- and book-to-market
sorted stock portfolios. We also find that this factor reduces the expected return to IPO stocks
relative to the non-IPO matched firms. The overall conclusion from our factor model estimation is
that, with holding periods up to five years, IPO excess returns are positive and reflect risk exposures
attenuated by both lower leverage and greater liquidity. The resulting estimates of abnormal returns
are not reliably different from zero.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a description of the data and
key sample characteristics, including leverage, liquidity, and frequency plots of extreme events and
returns. This section also presents average long-run buy-and-hold returns as well as the return to 5-
year rolling portfolios of IPO stocks. The factor model with macroeconomic risk factors is presented
in Section 3. The factor model estimation is also performed on portfolios of matched firms (matching
on size as well as on size and book-to-market ratios), and on a “zero-investment” portfolio long
3In the absence of a universally accepted empirical asset pricing model, our approach to model selection is agnostic.
We choose risk factors based on the works of, e.g., Chen, Roll, and Ross (1986), Ferson and Harvey (1991), Shanken
(1992) Evans (1994), Ferson and Korajczyk (1995), and Ferson and Schadt (1996).
4Alternatively, as in Hecht (2000) and Charoenrook (2001), one could examine the leverage effect on factor loadings
using estimates of firm (not equity) returns. We do not, however, have access to firm returns.
5See, e.g., Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996), Brennan, Chordia, and Subrahmanyam (1998), Datar, Naik, and
Radcliffe (1998)], Pastor and Stambaugh (2002), Eckbo and Norli (2002) and Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2002).
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in the IPO stocks and short in matched firms. Since the zero-investment portfolio represents the
difference between IPOs and their matches, results based on this portfolio are relatively robust with
respect to omitted factor bias. Section 4 presents the general liquidity risk factor and applies it to
our IPO portfolio, while Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Sample Characteristics
2.1 Selection of IPOs and control firms
The primary data source for our sample of IPOs is Securities Data Corporation’s (SDC’s) New Issues
database over the 1972 to 1998 period. The sample also includes IPOs from the dataset compiled
by Ritter (1991), covering the period 1975–1984, that is not present in the SDC database.6 These
sources generate a total sample of 6,379 IPOs satisfying the following sample restrictions: The
issuer is domiciled in the U.S., the IPO is on the Nasdaq Stock Exchange and it involves common
stocks only (excludes unit offerings), and the issuer must appear on the CRSP tapes within two
years of the offering.
Our sample selection criteria differ somewhat from those used by Loughran and Ritter (1995)
and Brav, Geczy, and Gompers (2000). The primary difference is our longer sample period:
Loughran and Ritter (1995) draw their sample of 4,753 IPOs from the period 1970–1990, while
the total sample of 4,622 IPOs in Brav, Geczy, and Gompers (2000) is from the 1975–1992 period.
Moreover, these other studies do not restrict their samples to Nasdaq IPOs. The Nasdaq-only
restriction excludes a total of 432 NYSE/AMEX IPOs that satisfy our remaining selection criteria.
This reflects the fact that more than 90% of the IPOs over the 28-year period took place on Nasdaq.
Figure 1 shows the annual distribution of the 6,379 IPOs in our total sample. Compustat
provides book-to-market data for 5,350 of the sample IPOs, with the missing information for the
most part occurring prior to the 1990s. Figure 1 also reveals a clustering of IPOs (“hot issue”
period) in the early to mid 1980s. Moreover, the figure shows a steady growth in the number of
IPOs from a low in 1990 through a high in 1996, with a subsequent decline towards the end of the
sample period.
Figure 2 (A) shows a frequency distribution of the equity size of the IPO firms relative to size-
6The IPOs compiled by Ritter (1991) is publicly available on the IPO resource page http://www.iporesources.org.
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deciles of NYSE and Nasdaq firms. When using NYSE size-breakpoints, it is clear that the IPO
stocks are relatively small as they tend to cluster in decile 1 (smallest) and 2. However, when using
Nasdaq breakpoints, the IPO sample is concentrated around deciles 6-8. Thus, the typical IPO
firm is not small relative to seasoned Nasdaq firms. Turning to Figure 2 (B), we see that the IPO
sample is concentrated around the lowest book-to-market-ratio deciles whether one uses NYSE or
Nasdaq breakpoints. Thus, the typical IPO exhibits low book-to-market regardless of the stock
exchange universe.
In order to provide a link to earlier studies, in particular Ritter (1991) and Loughran and Ritter
(1995), we systematically compare the returns on IPO stocks to a set of control firms matched on
both size and book-to-market ratio. Size-matched firms are selected from all companies listed on
the Nasdaq stock exchange at the end of the year prior to the IPO and that are not in our sample
of IPOs for a period of five years prior to the offer date. The size-matched firm is the firm closest
in market capitalization to the issuer, where the issuer’s market capitalization is the first available
market capitalization on the CRSP monthly tapes after the offering date.
When matching on size and book-to-market ratios, we use the same set of Nasdaq firms as
above, and select the subset of firms that have equity market values within 30% of the equity
market value of the issuer. This subset are ranked according to book-to-market ratios. The size
and book-to-market matched firm is the firm with the book-to-market ratio, measured at the end
of the year prior to the issue year, that is closest to the issuer’s ratio. Matched firms are included
for the full five-year holding period or until they are delisted, whichever occurs sooner. If a match
delists, a new match is drawn from the original list of candidates described above.
If available on COMPUSTAT, the issuer book value of equity is also measured at the end of the
year prior to the issue year. If this book value is not available, we use the first available book value on
Compustat starting with the issue year and ending with the year following the issue year.7 Following
Fama and French (1993) book value is defined as “the COMPUSTAT book value of stockholders
equity, plus balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credits (if available), minus the book
value of preferred stock. Depending on availability, we use the redemption, liquidation, or par value
(in that order) to estimate the value of preferred stock.” (Fama and French, 1993, p.8).
7On average, the first available book value is found 6.1 months after the offer date. Brav and Gompers (1997)
look a maximum of 12 months ahead for book values while Brav, Geczy, and Gompers (2000) look a maximum of 18
months ahead.
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Panel A of Table 1 shows several characteristics of the sample IPO firms and the control firms
matched on size and book-to-market. The average issuer has a total equity value of $76 mill. with
issue proceeds equaling 39% of its equity size. The average book-to-market ratio is 0.38. Matched
firms, whether matching on size only or size and book-to-market ratio, have greater leverage and
lower monthly turnover rates than issuer firms. We return to this observation below.
2.2 Buy-and-hold returns
It is common in the long-run performance literature to report the cross-sectional average of com-
pounded (holding period) returns, also referred to as “average buy-and-hold return” (BHR). Let
Rit denote the return to stock i over month t, and let ωi denote stock i’s weight in forming the
average holding-period return. The holding period for stock i is Ti which is either five years or the











Furthermore, several event studies use the difference in BHR for the event firms and their matched
firms as a definition of event-induced “abnormal” return, BHAR. In our context, this is given by
BHARIPOs ≡ BHRIPOs − BHRMatches. (2)
Table 2 shows the values of BHR and BHAR using control firms matched on size and both size and
book-to-market ratio. Notice first that when using value-weighting, there is no evidence of IPO
underperformance. Thus, in the following, we focus on the results for equal-weighted returns.
Panel (A) shows that for the full sample of 6,379 IPOs the equally weighted BHR for issuers
is 40.4%. This average buy-and-hold return is very close to the average return reported by Brav,
Geczy, and Gompers (2000), but about twice as high as the return reported by Loughran and Ritter
(1995). The discrepancy between our result and the result of Loughran and Ritter (1995) is due to
the extremely low returns earned by companies that went public during the period 1970–1972. The
equal-weighted BHR for size-matched firms is 69.1%, resulting in a relative IPO underperformance
8In an earlier draft, we showed that using shorter holding periods (1-year, 2-year, .. 4-year) does not alter the
main conclusions of this paper. These additional results are available upon request.
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of BHAR = −28.8%, which compares to the BHAR of −50.7% reported for the IPO sample in
Loughran and Ritter (1995).
As shown in the right half of Table 2, the underperformance resulting from size matching dis-
appears when matched firms are selected using both size and book-to-market ratio. The difference
in BHR between issuers and the size and book-to-market matched firms is now an insignificant
3%. Interestingly, this result is sensitive to the selection of Compustat information on book values.
The insignificant 3% underperformance results when missing Compustat book value information
is replaced by bringing back the first future book value observation (maximum of two years out).
While this is the standard procedure in the extant literature, it carries with it a survivorship bias.
The second part of Panel (B) Table 2 computes BHR and BHAR free of this survivorship bias.
That is, a firm is included only as of the date the book value information is available on Compustat.
The value of BHAR is now -12.1%, which is statistically significant on a 7% level.9
2.3 Post-IPO portfolio returns
The primary object of analysis in this paper is a 5-year running portfolio of IPO stocks. An IPO
stock is first included in this “issuer portfolio” in the month following the IPO date and held for five
years or until it delists from the exchange, whichever comes first. The first month of the portfolio
is January 1973 and the last month is December 2000. Thus, there are a total of 336 monthly
portfolio return observations over the 28-year period.
Returning to Table 1, Panel (B) shows the average monthly compounded return to the issuer
and matching firm portfolios using either equal-weights or value-weights. For the full sample of
6,379 IPOs, the average monthly return is 1.14% given equal-weighted portfolio returns. However,
a more interesting number is the monthly growth rate R implied by a $1 initial investment in
January 1973 growing to become $X=16.88 by December 2000. This growth rate is given by
R = eln(X)/T − 1 (3)
where “ln” denotes the natural logarithm and T is the number of months in the estimation (T =
9For analyses of the statistical properties of test statistics based on long-run return metrics such as BHAR see,
e.g., Kothari and Warner (1997), Barber and Lyon (1997), Lyon, Barber, and Tsai (1999), and Mitchell and Stafford
(2000). With the exeption of the descriptive analysis above, we do not focus on estimates of BHAR in this paper.
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336). As shown in Panel (B), R equals 0.84% per month for the equal-weighted issuer portfolio,
1.16% for the portfolio of size-matched firms, and an intermediate 1.05% for the portfolio of firms
matched on both size and book-to-market ratio. R is generally lower when portfolios are value-
weighted.
The growth rates of the issuer and matched firm portfolios are shown in Figure 3 for the case of
equal-weighted (EW) portfolios. The right side legend indicates the identity of the portfolio, and
inside the brackets are the terminal value of the initial $1 investment and the implied growth rate
R. Figure 3 also highlights the market-wide poor performance of the early years 1972-74. While not
shown here, if the starting point for the portfolio strategy is moved up to January 1975, the implied
growth rates increases substantially for all portfolios. Also, as noted by previous authors as well,
the effect of value-weighting is to reduce the difference between the average monthly compounded
returns of issuers and non-issuer stocks. Throughout the factor model estimation below, we show
parameter estimates for both value-weighted and equal-weighted portfolios.
Several conclusions emerge. First, regardless of the weighting scheme, the issuer portfolio
performs better than the risk-free asset but substantially worse than the Nasdaq market index. As
shown below, this underperformance is not driven by a low exposure to market risk: the portfolio
market beta is close to one. In Figure 3, the issuer portfolio underperforms the market index by
0.26% per month, or by 16.9% over the five-year holding period. Over the same period, the issuer
portfolio underperformed the portfolio of size-matched firms by 19.7% and the size and book-to-
market matched firms by 13.4%. These percentages compare to the underperformance of 26.6%
and the overperformance of 3% discussed earlier in Panel (B) of Table 2. Thus, while our portfolio
metric attenuates the magnitude of the underperformance (perhaps because it gives equal weight
to each of the 336 months in the total sample period, while BHR gives equal weight to each IPO
event), there is nevertheless evidence of significantly lower long-run returns to IPOs than to control
firms matched on size and book-to-market ratio.10
10As shown in an earlier draft, the effect of value-weighting is to nearly eliminate this underperformance This is
not surprising as value-weights favors larger, more successful stocks.
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2.4 Delistings and extreme returns
The return to the issuer portfolio is affected by delistings over the five-year holding period. Delist-
ings due to bankruptcy and liquidations reduce the realized return to the portfolio while delistings
due to premium takeovers increases portfolio return. Thus, the low return realization for the is-
suer portfolio may reflect a greater probability of negative delisting events than the case is for the
portfolio of non-IPO control firms.
Figures 4 and 5 address this possibility. Figure 4 (A) shows the annual frequency of delistings
due to liquidations over the sample period for both IPO and non-IPO firms. In each year, the front
column shows the percent of the total number of recent IPO firms (i.e., firms that undertook an
IPO within the past five years) that delisted that year. The rear column shows the same frequency
for non-IPO firms. The frequency is very similar for the two categories of firms and thus provide
no basis for arguing that IPO stocks have a greater risk of liquidations. Thus, the liquidation rate
is not an explanation for the low IPO return realizations.
Figure 4 (B) plots the frequency of delistings due to merger, takeover, exchange offer or other
events where common stockholders were bought out. If IPO stocks provide a better-than-average
bet on a future takeover, then it ought to be apparent from this figure. However, the figure provides
no basis for such an inference: if anything, in most years, the frequency of these takeover events
appear somewhat lower than for non-IPO stocks.
Figure 5 further indicates the nature of IPO stocks as “longshots.” Figure 5 (A) shows the
left tail of the frequency distribution of returns, i.e., returns below 500%. The plots are for the
IPO stocks as well as for firms matched on size and book-to-market ratio. Inspection of the left
boundary (at -100%) shows that IPO stocks do not exhibit an abnormal chance of this extreme
negative value. This finding is generally consistent with the evidence in Figure 4.
On the other hand, there is some evidence in Figure 5 (B) that IPO stocks have a greater
probability than non-IPO stocks of experiencing extreme return realizations of 1,000% of higher.
The right tail of the return distribution is somewhat higher for IPO stocks. Given the evidence on
takeover frequencies in Figure 4 (B), the extra probability mass under the 1,000% return outcome is
not driven by acquisitions. Rather, it may reflect the probability of the firm “growing into another
Microsoft” on its own. Regardless, given the low average return realization of the IPO portfolio,
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this extra “longshot” probability does not appear to represent priced risk.
2.5 Post-IPO leverage and liquidity
Table 3 shows average leverage ratios and measures of stock liquidity for the issue year and each
of the five years following the issue. Panel (A) documents that IPO stocks have significantly lower
leverage than either the size-matched or size/BM-matched firms in year 0 (the year of the IPO)
as well as in the two following years. This is true whether we measure leverage as the ratio of
long-term debt to total assets, long-term debt to market value of equity, or total debt (current
liabilities plus long-term debt) to total assets. We do not have data on actual leverage changes
(i.e., equity issues and/or debt repurchases) other than the IPO itself. Of course, the IPO-proceeds
itself cause a substantial reduction in leverage. Moreover, since IPO-companies are younger than
the matched firms, they tend to have less collateral and may therefore have lower optimal leverage
ratios. The lower debt policy may also be reinforced by the significant growth opportunities often
found in private companies selecting to go public. As these growth opportunities are exercised
and the firm builds collateral, the leverage ratios of IPO firms and the matched companies tend to
converge, much as shown in Panel (A) over the five-year post-IPO period.
Panel (B) of Table 3 shows the average annual values of our measure of liquidity: monthly
turnover computed as trading volume divided by the number of shares outstanding. With this
measure, IPO stocks are significantly more liquid than either size-matched or size/BM-matched
firms in each of the five years starting in year 1. Also, IPO stock liquidity tends to be greatest in
the year of the issue.
3 Leverage and expected returns
In this section we report abnormal returns to portfolios of issuing and matched firms defined using
a factor model with leverage-related risk factors. The regression results help answer the question
of whether the relatively low returns to IPO stocks shown earlier is consistent with standard risk
arguments. The most powerful answer to this questions comes from examining the abnormal return
to a zero-investment portfolio strategy where one goes long in the IPO stock and short the matched
firm, with a holding period of five years.
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3.1 Model specification and factor mimicking
Let rpt denote the return on portfolio p in excess of the risk-free rate, and assume that expected
excess returns are generated by a K-factor model,
E(rpt) = β′pλ, (4)
where βp is a K-vector of risk factor sensitivities (systematic risks) and λ is a K-vector of expected
risk premiums. This model is consistent with the APT model of Ross (1976) and Chamberlain
(1988) as well as with the intertemporal (multifactor) asset pricing model of Merton (1973).11 The
excess-return generating process can be written as
rpt = E(rpt) + β′pft + ept, (5)
where ft is a K-vector of risk factor shocks and ept is the portfolio’s idiosyncratic risk with expec-
tation zero. The factor shocks are deviations of the factor realizations from their expected values,
i.e., ft ≡ Ft−E(Ft), where Ft is a K-vector of factor realizations and E(Ft) is a K-vector of factor
expected returns.
Regression equation (5) requires specification of E(Ft), which is generally unobservable. How-
ever, consider the excess return rkt on a “factor-mimicking” portfolio that has unit factor sensitivity
to the kth factor and zero sensitivity to the remaining K − 1 factors. Since this portfolio must
also satisfy equation (4), it follows that E(rkt) = λk. Thus, when substituting a K-vector rFt of
the returns on factor-mimicking portfolios for the raw factors F , equations (4) and (5) imply the
following regression equation in terms of observables:
rpt = β′prFt + ept. (6)
Equation (6) generates stock p’s returns. Thus, inserting a constant term αp into a regression
estimate of equation (6) yields an unbiased estimate of abnormal return. We employ monthly
returns, so this “Jensen’s alpha,” first introduced by Jensen (1968), measures the average monthly
abnormal return to a portfolio over the estimation period.
11Connor and Korajczyk (1995) provide a review of APT models.
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As listed in Panel (A) of Table 4, the model contains a total of six factors: the value-weighted
CRSP market index (RM), the seasonally adjusted percent change in real per capita consumption
of nondurable goods (RPC), the difference in the monthly yield change on BAA-rated and AAA-
rated corporate bonds (BAA−AAA), unexpected inflation (UI), the return spread between Treasury
bonds with 20-year and one-year maturities (20y−1y), and the return spread between 90-day and
30-day Treasury bills (TBILLspr). These are the same factors that are used in Eckbo, Masulis, and
Norli (2000) in their study of the performance after seasoned security offerings, and similar factors
also appear in, Ferson and Harvey (1991), Evans (1994), Ferson and Korajczyk (1995), and Ferson
and Schadt (1996).12
Of the six factors, three are themselves security returns, and we create factor-mimicking portfo-
lios for the remaining three, RPC, BAA−AAA, and UI. Factor-mimicking portfolio are constructed
by first regressing the return of each of the 25 size and book-to-market sorted portfolios of Fama
and French on the set of six factors. These 25 time-series regressions produce a (25× 6) matrix B
of slope coefficients against the six factors. If V is the (25×25) covariance matrix of error terms for
these regressions (assumed to be diagonal), then the weights used to construct mimicking portfolios
from the 25 Fama-French portfolios are formed as
w = (B′V −1B)−1B′V −1. (7)
For each factor k, the return in month t on the corresponding mimicking portfolio is determined
by multiplying the kth row of factor weights with the vector of month t returns for the 25 Fama-
French portfolios. Mimicking portfolios are distinguished from the underlying macro factors ∆RPC,
BAA−AAA, and UI using the notation ∆̂RPC, ̂BAA−AAA, and ÛI.
As shown in Panel (B) of Table 4, the factor-mimicking portfolios are reasonable: they have
significant pairwise correlation with the raw factors they mimic, and they are uncorrelated with the
other mimicking portfolios and the other raw factors. Moreover, Panel (C) of Table 4 shows that
when we regress the mimicking portfolios on the set of six raw factors, it is only the own-factor slope
12The returns on T-bills, and T-bonds as well as the consumer price index used to compute unexpected inflation
are from the CRSP bond file. Consumption data are from the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic
Analysis (FRED database). Corporate bond yields are from Moody’s Bond Record. Expected inflation is modeled
by running a regression of real T-bill returns (returns on 30-day Treasury bills less inflation) on a constant and 12 of
its lagged values.
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coefficient that is significant.13 Turning to Panel (D) of Table 4, the pairwise correlation coefficient
between the six macroeconomic factors ranges from a minimum of −0.298 between ∆RPC and UI,
and a maximum of 0.395 between TBILLspr and 20y−1y.
We now turn to the estimation of this macro-factor model using portfolios of IPO stocks and
their control firms.
3.2 Parameter estimates
We estimate the parameters in the following macro-factor model:
rpt = αp+β1RMt+β2∆̂RPCt+β3( ̂BAA−AAA)t+β4ÛIt+β5(20y−1y)t+β6TBILLsprt+et, (8)
where et is a mean zero error term in month t, and the constant term (Jensen’s alpha) is the average
monthly abnormal return to portfolio p. The model is estimated using OLS with standard errors
computed using the heteroscedasticity-consistent estimator of White (1980).
Table 5 reports total sample estimates of Jensen’s alpha and factor loadings for six portfolios:
equal-weighted (EW) and value-weighted (VW) portfolios consisting of IPO-stocks only (“Issuer”),
size-matched firms only (“Match”), and the zero investment portfolio long in IPO stocks and
short in the matched firms (“Zero”). Thus, for IPO stocks to underperform the matched firms
(which would be consistent with the evidence presented earlier), the estimate of alpha for the zero
investment portfolio must be negative.
Notice first that nine of the twelve alpha estimates in Table 5 are negative and all are insignifi-
cant. The overall conclusion is that the monthly abnormal performance of IPO stocks is statistically
indistinguishable from the average monthly abnormal performance of the corresponding portfolio
of matched firms. In other words, the apparent underperformance of IPO stocks generated by the
matched firm technique is eliminated once we take into account the differential exposures (factor
loadings) of IPO stocks and matched firms to the macroeconomic risk factors in our regression
model.
13Let bk be the kth row of B. The weighted least squares estimators in (7) are equivalent to choosing the 25
portfolio weights wk for the kth mimicked factor in w so that they minimize w
′
kV wk subject to wkbi = 0, ∀k 6= i, and
w′kbk = 1, and then normalizing the weights so that they sum to one. Lehmann and Modest (1988) review alternative
factor mimicking procedures. As they point out, the normalization of the weights will generally produce own-factor
loadings, as those listed in Panel (C) of Table 4, that differ from one.
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Turning to the individual factor loadings reported in Table 5, IPO stocks have a significantly
greater exposure than matched firms to the market factor (RM). Panel (A) and (B) show that the
market beta for IPO stocks is 1.38 and 1.44 for the equal-weighted portfolios and 1.58 and 1.62 for
the value weighted portfolios.14 The corresponding betas are 0.97 and 1.27 for the equal-weighted
portfolios of matched firms and 1.07 and 1.33 for value-weighted matched firms. In other words,
the market risk factor increases the expected return to our zero-investment portfolio (since this
portfolio is long in issuer stocks). The significantly greater market beta for the issuer portfolio
occurs despite the “turbo-charging” effect of leverage on equity returns explained in Galai and
Masulis (1976).15 Thus, the contribution of the market risk factor itself is to make the evidence of
low IPO long-run returns even more puzzling.
For the low IPO returns to be explained in terms of risk exposure, there must exist non-market
risk factors that reduces the expected return to IPO stocks relative to matched firms. Table 5
shows that, of the non-market risk factors, the percent change in real per capita consumption
of non-durable goods (∆RPC) is statistically significant and positive for each of the issuer- and
match portfolios. Thus, expected portfolio returns are increasing in this factor. However, focusing
on the equal-weighted portfolio in Panel A, the product of the factor beta of 0.06 and the mean
factor return implies that this factor on average contributes only 0.013% per month to expected
portfolio return. Also, since the factor loadings are almost identical across the issuer and matched
firm portfolios (with a value of 0.06 for EW-Issuer and 0.05 for EW-Match), the zero-investment
portfolio does not have a statistically significant exposure to this factor. Thus, this particular risk
factor also does not contribute much to our understanding of the differential risk exposure of IPO
stocks versus size-matched firms.
The third risk factor in Table 5, the credit spread (BAA–AAA) is statistically significant for
each of the issuer and matching firm portfolios. Moreover, this factor significantly reduces the
expected return to the zero-investment portfolio. However, again the total factor contribution to
14The greater market beta for value-weighted than for equal-weighted portfolios reflects the fact that the average
IPO firm size is close to the population mean (Figure 2).
15Galai and Masulis (1976) illustrate this effect using the standard Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and the
Black-Scholes option pricing model. Let ηs = (∂s/∂v)/(s/v) denote the elasticity of the stock price s with respect to
total firm value v, The market beta estimated using equity returns can be written as βs = N(d1)(v/s)βv = ηsβv where
N(d1) is the cumulative Normal probability at d1 as defined in the Black-Scholes model, and βv is the market beta
estimated using total firm returns. As mentioned in the introduction, in a multifactor setting, this “turbo-charging”
effect of leverage appears in the factor loading of each risk factor.
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expected return is small (approximately one basis point per month). Thus, at appears that this
factor also does not help explain the differential return on the issuer- and matched-firm stocks. A
similar conclusion holds for unexpected inflation (UI).
The final two risk factors are the long-term bond spread (20y–1y) and the short T-bill spread
(TBILLspr). Both factors produce relatively large factor loadings and they tend to reduce the
expected return to issuer firms. Equal-weighted portfolios have significant loadings on the term
spread factor, while the factor loadings on the T-bill-spread factor are insignificant. The long-
term bond spread reduces the expected return to the EW-issuer portfolio by a significant five basis
points per month while the effect of the T-bill spread is to further reduce this expected return by
(a statistically insignificant) 6 basis points per month.
Overall, the evidence in Table 5 shows that the market risk factor by far is the dominant factor
impacting portfolio expected returns. While some of the non-market factors have statistically
significant betas, their overall contribution to expected return (factor loading times average factor
risk premium) is small. While the direction of the impact of these non-market factors is consistent
with the lower leverage of IPO stocks relative to matched firms, the magnitude of this effect is too
small to provide much confidence in this explanation alone.
Having said that, it remains true that the factor model ”prices” the portfolios in the sense of
producing constant terms (alphas) that are not significantly different from zero. Moreover, the
magnitudes of these constant terms (e.g., 17 basis points for EW issuer portfolio) is small by the
standards of the general asset pricing literature as well as extant papers on equity offerings. Thus,
we cannot rule out the hypothesis that the lower leverage of IPO firms implies lower exposure
to factors such as unexpected inflation and term premium and therefore lower expected returns
relative to matched firms. We now turn to a risk analysis of the second unique characteristic of
IPO stocks; their greater liquidity.16
16The above estimation of model (8) assumes that the factor loadings (β) are constant through time. Following
Ferson and Schadt (1996), we re-estimated Jensen’s alpha in a conditional factor model framework assuming that the
factor loadings are linearly related to a set of L known information variables Zt−1:
β1pt−1 = bp0 +Bp1Zt−1.
Here, bp0 is a K-vector of “average” factor loadings that are time-invariant, Bp1 is a (K × L) coefficient matrix, and
Zt−1 is an L-vector of information variables (observables) at time t−1. The product Bp1Zt−1 captures the predictable






p1(Zt−1 ⊗ rFt) + ept,
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4 Liquidity risk and expected returns
Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996), Datar, Naik, and Radcliffe (1998), and Brennan, Chordia,
and Subrahmanyam (1998) find that stock expected returns are cross-sectionally related to stock
liquidity measures. In particular, share turnover appears to be a priced asset characteristic that
lowers a stock’s expected return. This suggests that, since IPO firms have significantly higher
liquidity than matched firms (Table 3), they are also less risky and should command lower expected
returns than the matched firms over the post-issue period.
We examine this proposition using a factor model that includes liquidity as a risk factor. This
serves to link our IPO performance analysis to the asset pricing literature more generally, and it
provides new information on the role of liquidity as a determinant of expected returns. Absent a
theoretically “best” definition of liquidity, our approach is agnostic, and we use monthly turnover,
defined as the number of shares traded over the month divided by number of shares outstanding,
to construct the liquidity factor.17
4.1 Liquidity factor construction
We construct the liquidity factor, named TO, using an algorithm similar to the one used by Fama
and French (1993) when constructing their size (SMB) and book-to-market ratio (HML) factors.
To construct TO, we start in 1972 and form two portfolios based on a ranking of the end-of-year
market value of equity for all NYSE/AMEX stocks and three portfolios formed using NYSE/AMEX
stocks ranked on TO. Next, six portfolios are constructed from the intersection of the two market
value and the three turnover portfolios. Monthly value-weighted returns on these six portfolios
are calculated starting in January 1973. Portfolios are reformed in January every year using firm
rankings from December the previous year. The return on the TO portfolio is the difference between
where theKL-vector bp1 is vec(Bp1) and the symbol ⊗ denotes the Kronecker product. (The operator vec(·) vectorizes
the matrix argument by stacking each column starting with the first column of the matrix.) As information variables,
Zt−1, we used the lagged dividend yield on the CRSP value-weighted market index, the lagged 30-day Treasury
bill rate, and the lagged values of the credit and yield curve spreads, BAA−AAA and TBILLspr, respectively. The
resulting estimates of Jensen’s alpha support the overall conclusion of zero abnormal IPO stock performance. The
estimates are available upon request.
17Eckbo and Norli (2002) construct liquidity factors from several stock specific liquidity measures and confirm that
the turnover factor used here, as well a factor based on bid-ask spreads, are significant determinants of expected
stock returns, in the presence of the Fama and French (1993) factors and the Carhart (1997) momentum factor. See
also Table 7, below. Pastor and Stambaugh (2002) also show that trading volume impacts expected stock returns for
large portfolios.
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the equal-weighted average return on the two portfolios with low turnover and the equal-weighted
average return on the two portfolios with high turnover.
Comparing this procedure with the one used by Fama and French to create SMB and HML,
TO “plays the role” of the book-to-market factor. When Fama and French constructed their SMB
and HML factors, the idea was to “mimic the underlying risk factors in returns related to size and
book-to-market equity.” Their procedure tries to accomplish this goal by making sure that the
average size for the firms in the three book-to-market portfolios is the same, while also maintaining
the same average book-to-market ratio for the two size portfolios. The idea behind TO is similar,
but we try to capture the risk factor in return related to liquidity.
Having constructed the liquidity factor, we place this factor in a five-factor model that in
addition includes the three Fama-French factors (the market index RM, SMB, and HML), as well as
a momentum mimicking portfolio labeled UMD.18 The momentum factor is constructed in a slightly
different way than the momentum factor used by Carhart (1997). In particular, six value-weighted
portfolios are constructed as the intersections of two portfolios formed on market value of equity
(size) and three portfolios formed on prior twelve month return. Portfolios are formed monthly
using the median NYSE value for the size portfolios and the 30th and 70th NYSE percentiles for
the prior twelve month returns. The momentum factor, UMD, is the average return on the two
high prior return portfolios minus the average return on the two low prior return portfolios.
Table 6 shows the mean, standard deviation and pairwise correlations for the five risk factors.
In Panel (A), notice that the mean return the liquidity factor is positive. Recall that the factor is
a portfolio long in low-liquidity stocks and short in high-liquidity stocks. Thus, to the extent that
illiquid stocks are more “risky” than liquid stocks, they have higher average returns and thus the
factor portfolios have positive returns on average. Panel (B) of Table 6 shows that the HML portfolio
is positively related to TO. This is likely a reflection of the fact that it is constructed in the same
way as HML relative to size sorted portfolios. The momentum mimicking portfolio (UMD) does
not show any strong correlation with the other characteristic-based mimicking factors, suggesting
that these portfolios mimic underlying risk factors not captured by the other factor portfolios.
18We thank Ken French for providing us with the return series on these factors.
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4.2 Parameter estimates
Table 7 shows estimates of the five-factor model for each of the Fama-French 25 size and book-to-
market sorted portfolios. The table shows that adding the UMD factor and the TO factor to the
three-factor model of Fama and French (1993) improves the general model fit for most portfolios.
Interestingly, the liquidity risk factor TO appears to add at least as much explanatory power as
the momentum factor UMD.
Next, we apply the new factor model to the portfolio returns of IPOs and matched firms. The
results are shown in Table 8. Starting with a four factor model that amends the UMD factor to
the original Fama-French model, there is little evidence of significant IPO underpricing in the top
half of panel (A). Jensen’s alpha for the equal-weighted zero-investment portfolio is an insignificant
-0.15% per month (p-value of 0.205), while value-weighting produces a Jensen’s alpha of 0.06%,
also statistically insignificant.19 Moreover, moving to the expanded model in the second half of
panel (A), the alphas of the zero-investment portfolios are again uniformly insignificantly different
from zero. A very similar conclusion holds for Panel (B) where the control firms are matched on
size and book-to-market ratio.
As seen in Table 8, adding the liquidity factor only slightly improves the fit of the four factor
regression. For example, for the equal-weighted, zero-investment portfolio in Panel (A), the R2
increases from 0.530 in the four factor model to 0.549 in our expanded model. With value-weighted
portfolios, the increase in R2 is from 0.502 to 0.550. The momentum factor UMD is insignificant
across all the zero-investment portfolios. In contrast, the liquidity factors receives a significant
factor loading in several of the portfolios, including all of the zero-investment portfolios. The factor
loading on TO is generally negative, as expected. Greater liquidity lowers expected return, and the
reduction is greater for issuer stocks than for the matched firms in Table 8.20
Table 9 summarizes the factor contribution of the two asset pricing models used in this section
19Brav, Geczy, and Gompers (2000) use a similar model (where the momentum factor is generated as in Carhart
(1997)) and find somewhat larger estimates of alpha, ranging from -37 basis points to -11 basis points for their equal-
weighted and value-weighted portfolios, respectively. The larger alphas is due to their somewhat shorter sample
period (1975-95 versus our 1972-98 period) and smaller sample size (4,622 versus 5,350 in Panel B). Also, of their
total sample, 3,869 are Nasdaq IPOs, while we focus exclusively on Nasdaq issues.
20Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli (2000) find that also SEO firms have higher liquidity than matched firms. However,
they do not test for the risk reducing effects of liquidity. When applying the above factor model to their sample
of 3,315 SEOs from the period 1964–1997, we find that the liquidity factor is again statistically significant and
contributes to a greater extent than the momentum factor to the expected returns of issuers. It appears that the net
effect of the liquidity factor is to reduce the expected return to SEO stocks as well.
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and the previous. Again, the factor contribution is computed as the product of the mean monthly
factor returns over the sample period and the portfolio factor loadings reported above.21 In addition,
Table 9 lists the average monthly portfolio excess return (first column) and the average monthly
model return (i.e., the portfolio expected return given by the model). Since the main purpose of
Table 9 is expository, the earlier information on significance levels is left out.
Several summary conclusions emerge from Table 9. First, regardless of the model specification,
the excess return on the market factor RM alone generates almost all of the average portfolio
return. Second, in Panel (B), the four non-market factors compete almost on an ”equal footing”
in terms of factor contribution, perhaps with a slight edge to the SMB factor. Third, of the five
non-market factors in Panel (A), the term spread (20y - 1y) and TBILLspr appears to have factor
contributions of a similar magnitude to the factors HML, UMB and TO in the extended Fama-
French model. Fourth, the leverage-related risk factors 20y–1y, and TBILLspr reduces the expected
return to the issuer portfolio relative to the portfolio of matched firms. A similar conclusion holds
for the liquidity factor in Panel (B): the contribution of TO is to reduce expected return to the
issuer portfolio by a greater amount than for the matched portfolio. The latter is consistent with
the hypothesis that IPO stocks have lower expected return due to their generally greater liquidity
than the control firms matched on size and equity book-to-market ratio.
5 Conclusion
Using a multifactor, empirical asset pricing framework, we investigate the risk-return character-
istics of an unprecedented large sample of IPO stocks over the 1973-2000 period. The factors
are motivated by our finding that IPO stocks have significantly lower leverage ratios and exhibit
greater liquidity than other small growth stocks. Since leverage “turbo charges” equity returns by
increasing factor loadings, reducing leverage also reduces the stock’s exposure to leverage-related
risk factors. This argument notwithstanding, the market beta of IPO stocks is, if anything, greater
than for matched firms. On the other hand, using a factor model with macroeconomic risks, we
find that IPO stocks have somewhat lower exposures than matched firms to leverage-related factors
such as the default spread, the term spread and unexpected inflation. While the contribution of
21This, of course, is just a restatement of Eq. (6). The sample factor means are given in Table 4 and Table 6 and
are not repeated here.
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the non-market risk factors to overall portfolio expected return is small, the evidence does indi-
cate that the attenuating effect on average returns of the non-market risk factors help offset the
greater market risk exposure of IPO stocks. Overall, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the model
with macroeconomic risk factors prices the IPO portfolio in the sense of producing a statistically
insignificant intercept term (Jensen’s alpha).
Moreover, we examine the risk-reducing effects of greater liquidity through the lens of a factor
model based on the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model augmented with a momentum
factor and a new liquidity risk factor introduced here. The liquidity factor is constructed as the
return differential between a portfolio of low-liquidity stocks and a portfolio of high-liquidity stocks.
There is theoretical reason to suspect that such a factor is priced, and we show that the factor
indeed produces factor loadings of a magnitude and significance comparable to that produced by
the momentum factor. When applied to the IPO portfolio, the liquidity factor reduces expected
portfolio return, as predicted.
We also investigate the nature of the return distribution of IPO stocks by quantifying the
frequency of extreme events, including delistings due to liquidations and takeovers, as well as
extreme return observations. Interestingly, there is no evidence that IPO firms exhibit a chance of
delisting that differs from the typical non-IPO Nasdaq-listed company. Moreover, the frequency of
-100% return realizations is no greater for IPO stocks than for non-IPO firms matched on either
size and size and book-to-market ratio. However, there is a somewhat greater chance that an IPO
stock will experience a return realization of 1,000% or more. The low expected return to IPO
stocks suggests that this extra probability mass represents non-priced risk, perhaps confirming the
popular notion of IPO stocks as “longshot” bets on large, future returns.
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Figure 1
Annual Distribution of 6,379 Nasdaq IPOs with offer dates between 1972–1998.










1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998
22
Figure 2
IPO size and book-to-market ratio distributions, for the total sample of 6,379
Nasdaq IPOs, 1973-2000.
In Panel A, each IPO are placed in a size decile using either NYSE size breakpoints or Nasdaq
size breakpoints. In panel B, each IPO are placed in a book-to-market ratio decile using either
NYSE book-to-market breakpoints or Nasdaq book-to-market breakpoints. The column heights
represent the number of IPOs in each decile.











Small 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Large
Nasdaq breakpoints NYSE breakpoints







Low 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 High
Nasdaq breakpoints NYSE breakpoints
23
Figure 3
Compounded returns on the EW CRSP Nasdaq index, an EW portfolio of
Nasdaq-IPOs, an EW portfolio of matching firms, and 30-day Treasury bills, Total
sample of 6,379 IPOs, 1973–2000.
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Figure 4
Delistings due to liquidation, mergers or takeovers.
Panel A covers delistings due to liquidations. Panel B covers number of delistings due to merger,
takeover, exchange offers, or other events where common shareholders are bought out. In both
panels, front columns are delistings by recent IPO firms (IPO less than five years before delisting
date) divided by number of recent IPO firms. Back columns are delistings by Non-IPO firms (IPO
more than five years ago) divided by number of non-IPO firms. Total sample of 6,379 IPOs from
1972-1998.
(A) Delistings due to liquidation













(B) Delistings due to merger or takover














Histogram of five-year holding period returns between −100% and 1000% for issuers
and size/book-to-market matched control firms.
Each bar in the histogram represent a 2 percentage point interval, and the height of the bar
shows how many firms had a five-year holding period return within this 2 percentage point interval.
(A) Histogram of five-year holding period returns between −100% and 500%














(B) Histogram of five-year holding period returns between 100% and 1000%






















Firm characteristics and portfolio characteristics for 6,379 firms going public
between 1972 and 1998, and their non-issuing control firms matched on size and
size/book-to-market ratio. All issuers and matching firms are listed on Nasdaq.
The number of observations used to compute the numbers in panel A vary by the variables. The number of ob-
servations range between 4,832 and 6,379. The equal weighted and value weighted issuer and match portfolios are
constructed using monthly returns between January 1973 and December 2000, which gives 336 monthly returns for
each portfolio.
Size matching Size/Book-to-market matching
Issuer Match Issuer Match
(A) Average issuers and matching firms characteristics
Size (market capitalization) 76.41 76.37 84.12 84.41
Book value of equity — — 26.54 26.85
Book-to-market ratio — — 0.377 0.378
Issue proceeds/size 0.391 — 0.322 —
Long-term debt/Total assets 0.102 0.150 0.102 0.147
Total debt/Total assets 0.155 0.211 0.154 0.208
Long-term debt/Market value 0.148 0.457 0.147 0.249
Average monthly turnover 0.121 0.071 0.120 0.102
(B) Monthly issuer and matching firm portfolio returns
Equal weighted portfolios
Mean percent return 1.14 1.31 1.20 1.29
Median percent return 1.54 1.54 1.48 1.36
Standard deviation of returns 7.70 5.38 7.94 7.03
End-value of a $1 investment 16.88 48.14 19.27 32.68
Implied average return to compound 0.84 1.16 0.88 1.04
Value weighted portfolios
Mean percent return 1.12 1.19 1.24 1.11
Median percent return 1.21 1.76 1.28 1.51
Standard deviation of returns 8.45 5.59 8.64 7.02
End-value of a $1 investment 12.80 31.31 18.03 18.12
Implied average return to compound 0.76 1.03 0.86 0.87
Equal and value weighted portfolios
Number of issuers and matches 6,379 6,379 5,350 5,350
Minimum number of firms in portfolios 86 86 71 71
Maximum number of firms in portfolios 1,722 1,722 1,676 1,676
Average number of firms in portfolios 888 888 776 776
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Table 2
Five-year buy-and-hold stock percent returns (BHR) for a total of 6,379 firms going
public between 1972 and 1998, and their matched control firms, classified by type of
matching procedure (size/size-and-book-to-market), sample period, and portfolio
weights (equal-/value-weighted). All issuers and matching firms are listed on Nasdaq.










When equal-weighting (EW), ωi ≡ 1/N , and when value-weighting (VW), ωi =MVi/MV , where MVi is the issuer’s
common stock market value (in 1999 dollars) at the start of the holding period and MV =
∑
iMVi. The abnormal
buy-and-hold returns shown in the column marked “Diff” represent the difference between the BHR in the “Issuer” and
“Match” columns. The rows marked “N” contain number of issues. The p-values for equal-weighted abnormal returns
are p-values of the t-statistic using a two-sided test of no difference in average five-year buy-and-hold returns for issuer
and matching firms. The p-values for the value-weighted abnormal returns are computed using U ≡ ω′x/(σ√ω′ω),
where ω is a vector of value weights and x is the corresponding vector of differences in buy-and-hold returns for
issuer and match. Assuming that x is distributed normal N(µ, σ2) and that σ2 can be consistently estimated using∑
i ωi(xi − x¯)2, where x¯ =
∑
i ωixi, U is distributed N(0, 1).
Size matching Size/book-to-market matching
N Issuer Match Diff p(t) N Issuer Match Diff p(t)
(A) Total sample
EW 6379 40.4 69.1 −28.8 0.000
VW 6379 68.7 78.6 −10.0 0.302
(B) Require sample firms to have book values on Compustat
Holding period starts the month after the IPO date (looking ahead for the first book value on Compustat)
EW 5350 46.3 72.5 −26.2 0.000 5350 46.3 43.3 3.0 0.627
VW 5350 74.8 82.2 −7.4 0.507 5350 74.8 59.1 15.7 0.130
Holding period starts the month after first post-IPO book value on Compustat
EW 5225 47.3 73.3 −25.9 0.000 5225 47.3 59.4 −12.1 0.066
VW 5225 125.9 82.8 43.0 0.047 5225 125.9 89.6 36.2 0.102
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Table 3
Average annual leverage ratios and liquidity for firms going public between 1972 and
1998, and their non-issuing control firms matched on size and size/book-to-market
ratio. All issuers and matching firms are listed on Nasdaq.
The leverage variables are computed using long-term debt, total debt (long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities),
and total assets at the end of the fiscal year (as reported by COMPUSTAT). Market values are measured at the
end of the calendar year. Observations with negative book equity value and observations with a long-term debt to
market value ratio that exceeds 10,000 are excluded. Turnover is volume divided by number of shares outstanding.





by market value of equity
Total debt divided
by total assets
Year N Issuer Match p-diff Issuer Match p-diff Issuer Match p-diff
Issuers and size matched firms
0 4042 0.100 0.145 0.000 0.153 0.438 0.000 0.152 0.202 0.000
1 3959 0.124 0.149 0.000 0.290 0.483 0.000 0.184 0.205 0.000
2 3444 0.139 0.147 0.057 0.372 0.459 0.001 0.199 0.203 0.337
3 2849 0.151 0.149 0.771 0.433 0.509 0.025 0.212 0.206 0.231
4 2170 0.150 0.146 0.465 0.572 0.488 0.202 0.213 0.206 0.278
5 1869 0.153 0.152 0.802 0.659 0.511 0.042 0.213 0.213 0.952
Issuers and size/book-to-market matched firms
0 4649 0.102 0.144 0.000 0.161 0.255 0.000 0.154 0.203 0.000
1 4407 0.125 0.150 0.000 0.291 0.337 0.012 0.185 0.211 0.000
2 3710 0.139 0.150 0.010 0.379 0.350 0.248 0.199 0.209 0.031
3 3043 0.147 0.153 0.206 0.448 0.409 0.297 0.209 0.213 0.496
4 2319 0.146 0.152 0.246 0.524 0.417 0.062 0.209 0.216 0.270
5 1941 0.156 0.158 0.692 0.608 0.483 0.031 0.217 0.225 0.229





Year N Issuer Match p-diff Issuer Match p-diff
0 4486 0.126 0.074 0.000 0.125 0.105 0.000
1 4801 0.111 0.074 0.000 0.114 0.098 0.000
2 4641 0.120 0.077 0.000 0.126 0.097 0.000
3 4022 0.120 0.079 0.000 0.125 0.100 0.000
4 3330 0.119 0.077 0.000 0.124 0.102 0.000
5 2736 0.106 0.071 0.000 0.113 0.090 0.000
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Table 4
Factor mimicking portfolios and macroeconomic variables used as risk factors,
January 1973 to December 2000.
A factor mimicking portfolio is constructed by first regressing the returns on each of the 25 size and book-to-market
sorted portfolios of Fama and French (1993) on the total set of six factors, i.e., 25 time-series regressions producing a
(25×6) matrix B of slope coefficients against the factors. If V is the (25×25) covariance matrix of the error terms in
these regressions (assumed to be diagonal), then the weights on the mimicking portfolios are: w = (B′V −1B)−1B′V −1
(see Lehmann and Modest (1988)). For each factor k, the return in month t for the corresponding mimicking portfolio
is calculated from the cross-product of row k in w and the vector of month t returns on the 25 Fama-French portfolios.
(A) Raw macroeconomic variables
N Mean Std Dev
Excess return on the market index (RM) 336 0.539 4.649
Change in real per capita consumption of nondurable goods (∆RPC)a 336 0.053 0.686
Difference in BAA and AAA yield change (BAA−AAA) 336 -0.012 1.138
Unanticipated inflation (UI)b 336 -0.024 0.253
Return difference on Treasury bonds (20y−1y)c 336 0.109 2.649
Return difference on Treasury bills (TBILLspr)d 336 0.052 0.115
(B) Correlation between raw macroeconomic factor and the factor mimicking portfolio
Mimicking factor ∆RPC BAA−AAA UI
∆̂RPC 0.265 (0.000) 0.011 (0.836) −0.046 (0.401)
̂BAA−AAA 0.004 (0.935) 0.265 (0.000) −0.026 (0.631)
ÛI 0.001 (0.991) −0.031 (0.575) 0.287 (0.000)
(C) Correlation between macroeconomic factors
RM ∆̂RPC ̂BAA−AAA ÛI 20y−1y TBILLspr
RM 1.000
∆̂RPC -0.008 1.000
̂BAA−AAA 0.013 -0.099 1.000
ÛI 0.020 -0.298 0.266 1.000
20y−1y 0.314 -0.004 0.080 -0.067 1.000
TBILLspr 0.115 0.028 0.066 -0.062 0.395 1.000
aSeasonally adjusted real per capita consumption of nondurable goods are from the FRED database.
bUnanticipated inflation (UI) is generated using a model for expected inflation that involves running a regression of
real returns (returns on 30-day Treasury bills less inflation) on a constant and 12 of it’s lagged values.
cThis is the return spread between Treasury bonds with 20-year and 1-year maturities.




Jensen’s alphas and constant factor loadings for stock portfolios of a total of 6,379
firms going public on Nasdaq and non-issuing Nasdaq firms matched on size and
size/book-to-market ratio, classified by portfolio weights. Portfolios are first formed
in January 1973 and held until December 2000.
The model is:
rpt = αp + β1RMt + β2∆̂RPCt + β3( ̂BAA−AAA)t + β4ÛIt + β5(20y − 1y)t + β6TBILLsprt + et
where rpt is either a portfolio excess return or a return on a zero investment portfolio that is long issuers and short
in mathcing firms, RM is the excess return on the market index, RPC is the percent change in the real per capita
consumption of nondurable goods, BAA−AAA is the difference in the monthly yield changes on bonds rated BAA
and AAA by Moody’s, UI is unanticipated inflation, 20y−1y is the return difference between Treasury bonds with 20
years to maturity and 1 year to maturity, and TBILLspr is the return difference between 90-day and 30-day Treasury
bills. The factors ∆̂RPC, ̂BAA−AAA, and ÛI are mimicking portfolios for the corresponding raw factors. T is the
number of months in the time series regression, N is the average number of firms in the portfolio, and I is the number
of issues used to construct the portfolio. The coefficients are estimated using OLS. Standard errors are computed
using the heteroscedasticity consistent estimator of White (1980). The numbers in parentheses are p-values.
Factor betas (T=336, N=888)
Portfolio αˆ RM ∆̂RPC ̂BAA−AAA ÛI 20y−1y TBILLspr Rsq
(A) Issuers and size matched control firms (I=6,379)
EW-issuer −0.17 (.510) 1.38 (.000) 0.06 (.000) −0.03 (.000) 0.05 (.000) −0.42 (.000) −0.46 (.845) 0.704
EW-match 0.10 (.566) 0.97 (.000) 0.05 (.000) −0.01 (.000) 0.04 (.000) −0.26 (.000) 1.76 (.218) 0.736
EW-zero −0.27 (.102) 0.41 (.000) 0.01 (.104) −0.01 (.000) 0.01 (.212) −0.16 (.027) −2.22 (.178) 0.364
VW-issuer −0.12 (.651) 1.58 (.000) 0.03 (.023) −0.02 (.016) −0.02 (.360) −0.29 (.012) −2.37 (.305) 0.731
VW-match −0.02 (.903) 1.07 (.000) 0.03 (.012) −0.01 (.095) 0.00 (.691) −0.14 (.023) 1.54 (.316) 0.780
VW-zero −0.10 (.635) 0.51 (.000) 0.00 (.583) −0.01 (.117) −0.02 (.093) −0.14 (.129) −3.92 (.034) 0.309
(B) Issuers and size/book-to-market matched control firms (I=5,350)
EW-issuer −0.10 (.709) 1.44 (.000) 0.06 (.000) −0.03 (.000) 0.05 (.001) −0.47 (.000) −1.21 (.614) 0.715
EW-match −0.02 (.913) 1.27 (.000) 0.06 (.000) −0.02 (.000) 0.05 (.000) −0.39 (.000) 0.80 (.703) 0.729
EW-zero −0.07 (.581) 0.18 (.000) −0.00 (.220) −0.00 (.159) 0.00 (.687) −0.08 (.105) −2.01 (.117) 0.135
VW-issuer 0.02 (.940) 1.62 (.000) 0.03 (.025) −0.02 (.018) −0.02 (.283) −0.32 (.006) −2.99 (.224) 0.728
VW-match −0.15 (.474) 1.33 (.000) 0.04 (.010) −0.01 (.034) 0.00 (.936) −0.20 (.010) −0.01 (.993) 0.764
VW-zero 0.17 (.372) 0.29 (.000) −0.01 (.246) −0.00 (.345) −0.02 (.052) −0.12 (.138) −2.97 (.104) 0.160
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Table 6
Descriptive statistics for characteristic based risk factors, January 1973 to December
2000 sample period.
The size factor (SMB) is the return on a portfolio of small firms minus the return on a portfolio of large firms (See
Fama and French, 1993). The momentum factor (UMD) is constructed using a procedure similar to Carhart (1997):
It is the return on a portfolio of the one-third of the CRSP stocks with the highest buy-and-hold return over the
previous 12 months minus the return on a portfolio of the one-third of the CRSP stocks with the lowest buy-and-hold
return over the previous 12 months. The SMB, HML, and UMD factors are constructed by Ken French and are
downloaded from his web-page. The liquidity factor TO is constructed using an algorithm similar to the one used by
Fama and French (1993) when constructing the SMB and HML factors. To construct TO, we start in 1972 and form
two portfolios based on a ranking of the end-of-year market value of equity for all NYSE/AMEX stocks and three
portfolios formed using NYSE/AMEX stocks ranked on TO. Next, six portfolios are constructed from the intersection
of the two market value and the three turnover portfolios. Monthly value-weighted returns on these six portfolios are
calculated starting in January 1973. Portfolios are reformed in January every year using firm rankings from December
the previous year. The return on the TO portfolio is the difference between the equal-weighted average return on the
two portfolios with low turnover and the equal-weighted average return on the two portfolios with high turnover.
(A) Characteristic based factors
N Mean Std Dev
Difference in returns between small firms and big firms (SMB) 336 0.099 3.346
Difference in return between firms with high and low book-to-market (HML) 336 0.453 3.120
Difference in return between winners and losers (UMD) 336 1.010 3.814
Difference in return between firms with high and low turnover (TO) 336 0.115 2.727
(B) Correlation between characteristic based factors
RM SMB HML UMD TO
RM 1.000
SMB 0.257 1.000
HML -0.473 -0.312 1.000
UMD 0.093 0.101 -0.314 1.000
TO -0.673 -0.544 0.522 -0.098 1.000
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Table 7
Factor-betas and t-values for the extended Fama-French model using 25 size and
book-to-market sorted portfolios as test assets
The model is:
rpt = αp + β1RMt + β2SMBt + β3HMLt + β4UMDt + β5TOt + et
where rpt is excess return on the 25 Fama and French (1993) size and book-to-market ratio sorted portfolios. RM
is the excess return on a value weighted market index, SMB and HML are the Fama and French (1993) size and
book-to-market factors, UMD is a momentum factor and is constructed as the return difference between the one-third
highest and one-third lowest CRSP performers over the past 12 months. The SMB, HML, and UMD factors are
constructed by Ken French and are downloaded from his web-page. The liquidity factor TO is constructed using
an algorithm similar to the one used by Fama and French (1993) when constructing the SMB and HML factors.
To construct TO, we start in 1972 and form two portfolios based on a ranking of the end-of-year market value of
equity for all NYSE/AMEX stocks and three portfolios formed using NYSE/AMEX stocks ranked on TO. Next, six
portfolios are constructed from the intersection of the two market value and the three turnover portfolios. Monthly
value-weighted returns on these six portfolios are calculated starting in January 1973. Portfolios are reformed in
January every year using firm rankings from December the previous year. The return on the TO portfolio is the
difference between the equal-weighted average return on the two portfolios with low turnover and the equal-weighted
average return on the two portfolios with high turnover. The coefficients are estimated using OLS. Standard errors
are computed using the heteroscedasticity consistent estimator of White (1980). The model is estimated using
monthly data over the sample period April 1963 through December 2000, giving 453 observations. The numbers in
parentheses are t-values.
Intercept RM SMB HML UMD TO ARsq
P11 −0.38( −3.75) 0.97( 33.46) 1.32 ( 26.44) −0.27 ( −5.23) 0.04 ( 1.21) −0.21( −3.25) 0.93
P12 −0.01( −0.07) 0.95( 34.54) 1.33 ( 27.15) 0.07 ( 1.67) 0.03 ( 0.99) −0.01( −0.15) 0.94
P13 0.04 ( 0.56) 0.94( 48.52) 1.11 ( 37.83) 0.28 ( 9.03) −0.03( −1.27) −0.01( −0.30) 0.96
P14 0.18 ( 2.77) 0.91( 46.15) 1.04 ( 25.40) 0.44 ( 14.01) −0.02( −1.05) −0.00( −0.03) 0.95
P15 0.14 ( 2.02) 0.99( 46.53) 1.09 ( 26.32) 0.67 ( 18.08) −0.03( −1.25) 0.02 ( 0.36) 0.95
P21 −0.05( −0.63) 1.00( 45.89) 0.88 ( 21.51) −0.39(−10.77) −0.04( −1.38) −0.30( −5.86) 0.96
P22 0.03 ( 0.37) 1.02( 44.29) 0.84 ( 25.61) 0.13 ( 3.68) −0.11( −4.40) −0.05( −1.22) 0.95
P23 0.17 ( 2.61) 0.97( 44.34) 0.72 ( 19.69) 0.39 ( 9.79) −0.07( −2.72) −0.06( −1.40) 0.94
P24 0.10 ( 1.55) 1.00( 53.39) 0.69 ( 27.07) 0.56 ( 17.41) −0.03( −1.15) 0.03 ( 0.76) 0.94
P25 0.03 ( 0.38) 1.06( 48.86) 0.78 ( 29.55) 0.77 ( 25.45) −0.00( −0.22) −0.06( −1.70) 0.95
P31 0.02 ( 0.18) 1.03( 41.10) 0.65 ( 13.01) −0.40(−10.64) −0.05( −1.97) −0.21( −4.15) 0.95
P32 0.17 ( 1.95) 1.00( 35.43) 0.44 ( 8.90) 0.19 ( 4.11) −0.08( −2.52) −0.18( −3.10) 0.91
P33 0.07 ( 0.88) 0.98( 41.19) 0.38 ( 7.64) 0.47 ( 10.76) −0.10( −3.96) −0.13( −2.32) 0.90
P34 0.10 ( 1.24) 0.99( 44.67) 0.35 ( 9.54) 0.64 ( 14.78) −0.07( −2.22) −0.05( −0.99) 0.90
P35 0.11 ( 1.33) 1.06( 43.08) 0.47 ( 9.86) 0.82 ( 21.11) −0.05( −1.88) −0.12( −2.32) 0.90
P41 0.18 ( 2.26) 0.98( 37.56) 0.29 ( 6.21) −0.43(−11.36) 0.02 ( 0.62) −0.19( −4.42) 0.94
P42 −0.00( −0.05) 1.05( 33.96) 0.13 ( 2.58) 0.19 ( 3.91) −0.13( −4.05) −0.16( −2.73) 0.89
P43 0.11 ( 1.34) 1.03( 43.13) 0.08 ( 1.38) 0.47 ( 10.11) −0.09( −3.00) −0.19( −3.08) 0.89
P44 0.17 ( 2.12) 1.00( 35.42) 0.17 ( 4.09) 0.59 ( 14.27) −0.05( −1.58) −0.10( −2.04) 0.88
P45 0.11 ( 1.10) 1.06( 34.91) 0.12 ( 2.61) 0.86 ( 20.20) −0.06( −1.88) −0.34( −6.01) 0.86
P51 0.25 ( 3.60) 0.97( 46.35) −0.24( −8.39) −0.40(−12.68) −0.03( −1.31) 0.04 ( 1.01) 0.93
P52 −0.00( −0.03) 1.04( 42.80) −0.26( −6.79) 0.09 ( 2.12) −0.05( −1.59) 0.00 ( 0.06) 0.90
P53 −0.07( −0.83) 0.99( 37.93) −0.29( −7.05) 0.26 ( 7.06) 0.02 ( 0.52) −0.01( −0.25) 0.84
P54 −0.02( −0.29) 0.98( 39.89) −0.27( −8.95) 0.60 ( 20.14) −0.06( −2.90) −0.12( −2.83) 0.89
P55 −0.07( −0.70) 0.94( 27.91) −0.14( −2.26) 0.83 ( 15.26) −0.03( −0.77) −0.23( −3.54) 0.80
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Table 8
Jensen’s alphas, Fama and French (1993) factor loadings, and factor loadings for
momentum and liquidity factors for stock portfolios of a total of 6,379 firms going
public on Nasdaq and non-issuing Nasdaq firms matched on size and
size/book-to-market, classified by portfolio weights. Portfolios are first formed in
January 1973 and held until December 2000.
The model is:
rpt = αp + β1RMt + β2SMBt + β3HMLt + β4UMDt + β5TOt + et
where rpt is either a portfolio excess return or a return on a zero investment portfolio that is long issuers and short
in mathcing firms, RM is the excess return on a value weighted market index, SMB and HML are the Fama and
French (1993) size and book-to-market factors, UMD is a momentum factor and is constructed as the return difference
between the one-third highest and one-third lowest CRSP performers over the past 12 months. The SMB, HML,
and UMD factors are constructed by Ken French and are downloaded from his web-page. The liquidity factor TO
is constructed using an algorithm similar to the one used by Fama and French (1993) when constructing the SMB
and HML factors. To construct TO, we start in 1972 and form two portfolios based on a ranking of the end-of-year
market value of equity for all NYSE/AMEX stocks and three portfolios formed using NYSE/AMEX stocks ranked
on TO. Next, six portfolios are constructed from the intersection of the two market value and the three turnover
portfolios. Monthly value-weighted returns on these six portfolios are calculated starting in January 1973. Portfolios
are reformed in January every year using firm rankings from December the previous year. The return on the TO
portfolio is the difference between the equal-weighted average return on the two portfolios with low turnover and the
equal-weighted average return on the two portfolios with high turnover. In the panel headings, T is the number of
months in the time series regression, N is the average number of firms in the portfolio, and I is the number of issues
used to construct the portfolio. The coefficients are estimated using OLS. Standard errors are computed using the
heteroscedasticity consistent estimator of White (1980). The numbers in parentheses are p-values.
Factor betas (T=336, N=888 )
Portfolio αˆ RM SMB HML UMD TO A-Rsq
(A) Issuers and size matched control firms (I=6,379)
EW-issuer −0.01 (0.958) 1.05 (0.000) 1.18 (0.000) −0.10 (0.214) −0.04 (0.508) 0.860
EW-match 0.14 (0.126) 0.85 (0.000) 0.91 (0.000) 0.27 (0.000) −0.06 (0.024) 0.917
EW-zero −0.15 (0.205) 0.20 (0.000) 0.27 (0.000) −0.37 (0.000) 0.02 (0.666) 0.530
VW-issuer 0.07 (0.651) 1.13 (0.000) 0.90 (0.000) −0.68 (0.000) 0.11 (0.047) 0.903
VW-match 0.01 (0.892) 0.90 (0.000) 0.70 (0.000) −0.03 (0.558) 0.08 (0.035) 0.919
VW-zero 0.06 (0.749) 0.23 (0.000) 0.20 (0.020) −0.65 (0.000) 0.03 (0.668) 0.502
EW-issuer 0.05 (0.780) 0.97 (0.000) 1.10 (0.000) −0.06 (0.525) −0.03 (0.607) −0.28 (0.039) 0.864
EW-match 0.14 (0.127) 0.85 (0.000) 0.90 (0.000) 0.27 (0.000) −0.06 (0.023) −0.01 (0.848) 0.917
EW-zero −0.10 (0.387) 0.12 (0.005) 0.20 (0.002) −0.33 (0.000) 0.03 (0.557) −0.26 (0.003) 0.549
VW-issuer 0.18 (0.216) 0.97 (0.000) 0.73 (0.000) −0.59 (0.000) 0.12 (0.011) −0.56 (0.000) 0.915
VW-match 0.01 (0.895) 0.90 (0.000) 0.70 (0.000) −0.03 (0.556) 0.08 (0.036) −0.00 (0.991) 0.919
VW-zero 0.16 (0.308) 0.07 (0.198) 0.03 (0.689) −0.55 (0.000) 0.04 (0.454) −0.56 (0.000) 0.550
(B) Issuers and size/book-to-market matched control firms (I=5,350)
EW-issuer 0.06 (0.718) 1.09 (0.000) 1.19 (0.000) −0.15 (0.091) −0.05 (0.465) 0.862
EW-match 0.13 (0.313) 1.01 (0.000) 1.14 (0.000) 0.06 (0.366) −0.08 (0.086) 0.881
EW-zero −0.08 (0.487) 0.08 (0.007) 0.05 (0.214) −0.20 (0.000) 0.03 (0.378) 0.192
VW-issuer 0.19 (0.225) 1.15 (0.000) 0.90 (0.000) −0.72 (0.000) 0.11 (0.056) 0.897
VW-match −0.06 (0.599) 1.02 (0.000) 0.90 (0.000) −0.31 (0.000) 0.12 (0.005) 0.934
VW-zero 0.25 (0.125) 0.13 (0.010) −0.00 (0.988) −0.41 (0.000) −0.01 (0.935) 0.234
EW-issuer 0.12 (0.448) 1.00 (0.000) 1.10 (0.000) −0.09 (0.317) −0.04 (0.569) −0.32 (0.018) 0.866
EW-match 0.16 (0.226) 0.97 (0.000) 1.09 (0.000) 0.08 (0.219) −0.08 (0.111) −0.15 (0.193) 0.882
EW-zero −0.04 (0.692) 0.03 (0.426) 0.00 (0.963) −0.17 (0.001) 0.04 (0.301) −0.18 (0.009) 0.208
VW-issuer 0.32 (0.026) 0.96 (0.000) 0.71 (0.000) −0.61 (0.000) 0.13 (0.008) −0.65 (0.000) 0.912
VW-match −0.03 (0.781) 0.98 (0.000) 0.86 (0.000) −0.28 (0.000) 0.12 (0.003) −0.14 (0.054) 0.935
VW-zero 0.35 (0.024) −0.02 (0.801) −0.15 (0.122) −0.33 (0.000) 0.01 (0.870) −0.51 (0.000) 0.296
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Table 9
Average portfolio return, and individual factor contribution to portfolio expected
return, for stock portfolios of firms going public on Nasdaq and non-issuing Nasdaq
firms matched on size and book-to-market ratio. Portfolios are first formed in
January 1973 and held until December 2000.
The returns on the issuer and match portfolios are reported in excess of the one month Treasury bill. For the model in
panel (A), RM is the excess return on the market index, RPC is the percent change in the real per capita consumption
of nondurable goods, BAA−AAA is the difference in the monthly yield changes on bonds rated BAA and AAA by
Moody’s, UI is unanticipated inflation, 20y−1y is the return difference between Treasury bonds with 20 years to
maturity and 1 year to maturity, and TBILLspr is the return difference between 90-day and 30-day Treasury bills.
For the model in panel (B) RM is the excess return on a value weighted market index, SMB and HML are the Fama
and French (1993) size and book-to-market factors, UMD is a momentum factor and is constructed as the return
difference between the one-third highest and one-third lowest CRSP performers over the past 12 months. The factor is
constructed by Ken French and is downloaded from his web-page. TO (monthly volume divided by number of shares
outstanding) is a liquidity factor. To construct TO, we start in 1972 and form two portfolios based on a ranking of
the end-of-year market value of equity for all NYSE/AMEX stocks and three portfolios formed using NYSE/AMEX
stocks ranked on TO. Next, six portfolios are constructed from the intersection of the two market value and the three
turnover portfolios. Monthly value-weighted returns on these six portfolios are calculated starting in January 1973.
Portfolios are reformed in January every year using firm rankings from December the previous year. The return on
the TO portfolio is the difference between the equal-weighted average return on the two portfolios with low turnover









Factor contribution to expected return
(Mean return on factor mimicking portfolio times factor-beta)
(A) Macro-factor model
RM ∆̂RPC ̂BAA−AAA ÛI 20y−1y TBILLspr
EW-Issuer 0.65 0.75 0.777 0.013 -0.002 0.070 -0.052 -0.062
EW-Match 0.74 0.76 0.682 0.014 -0.001 0.066 -0.043 0.041
VW-Issuer 0.69 0.67 0.874 0.008 -0.001 -0.025 -0.035 -0.154
VW-Match 0.55 0.70 0.715 0.010 -0.001 0.002 -0.022 -0.001
(B) Extended Fama-French Model
RM SMB HML UMD TO
EW-Issuer 0.65 0.53 0.536 0.109 -0.042 -0.038 -0.037
EW-Match 0.74 0.58 0.521 0.109 0.036 -0.076 -0.017
VW-Issuer 0.69 0.37 0.518 0.070 -0.276 0.131 -0.074
VW-Match 0.55 0.58 0.526 0.085 -0.128 0.121 -0.016
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